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- Proffitt v. Florida

In 1972, immediately after the Court's decision in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, the Florida legisiature passed
· new statutes providing for the occasions and the procedures
for the imposition of the death penalty.

The statutes provide

1/
that certain felonies, including first degree murder,-

con-

stitute "capital felonies," which are punishable by life imprisonment unless it is determined in the special punishment

2/
proceeding that the offender shall be punished by death.1/ The murder statute under which petitioner was convicted reads
as follows:

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.04 (1973)
Murder
"( 1) (a) The unlawful killing of a human being
when perpetrated from a premeditated design to
effect the death of the person killed or any hum~n
being. or when committed by a person engaged m
the perpetration of, or in the attempt to
perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or the unlawful
throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb, or which resulted from the
unlawful distribution of heroin by a person over
the age of seventeen years when such drug is
proven to be the proximate cause of the death of
the user, shall be murder in the first degree and
shall constitute a capital felony, punishable as
provided in § 775.082.
(b) In all cases under this section, the procedure
set forth in section 921.141 shall be followed in
orcter to determine sentence of death or life
imprisonment.
~/

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.082 (1973)
Penalties for felonies and misdemeanors
"( 1) A person who has been convicted of a capital
felony shall be -punished by life imprisonment and
shall be required to serve no less than twenty-five
(25) calendar years before becoming eligible for
parole unless the proceeding held to determine
sentence accordjng to the procedure set forth in
section 921.141 results in findings by the Court .
that such person shall be punished by death, and
in the latter event such person shall be punished
by death. ''

.l

The proceeding which determines whether or not the death
penalty should be imposed is held after the defendant has been

3/
convicted of the capital felony.-

This separate proceeding is

conducted by the trial judge before the same jury which de-

4/
termined the defendant's guilt.-

Evidence may be presented on

any matter the judge deems relevant to sentences and must include
matters relating to certain legislatively specified aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.

Both the state and the· defense

may present argument on whether the death penalty shall be imposed.
After the evidence and argument have been presented, the
jury must decide whether or not it will recommend that the death
penalty be imposed.

In deliberating on this question, the jury

is to follow what is essentially a three stage process.

First,

it must decide whether there exist sufficient statutory aggravating
5/
circumstances to justify imposing the death penalty.The jury

ll

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141 (1973).

4/ Either the trial jury or the punishment jury, or both, may
be waived by the defendant.
5/ The aggravating and mitigating circumstances are set out in
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141 (5) and (6) (1973):

'' (5) Aggravating circumstances. -Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a
person under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of
another capital felony or of a felony involving the
use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk
of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the
defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, any
robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or
aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing,
or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest
or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony
pecuniary gain.

was committed

- 2 -
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r

i

must then decide whether there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.

And

finally, based on these considerations, the jury must decide
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life

--------

imprisonment.

When a majority of the jury has agreed, the

jury's advisory verdict is returned.
The Court is not bound by the jury's verdict.

It must

itself weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and
decide what sentence it will impose.

If the Court imposes a

sentence of death, it must make specific written findings concerning the sufficient aggravating circumstanc.es and the in-

·

sufficient mitigating circumstances.
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death is subject

6/
to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida.-

This

review is intended to ensure that the decision between death and
life imprisonment is made rationally, not arbitrarily.
5/

(Continued)

(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt
or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental
function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel.
(6) Mitigating circumstances. - Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of
prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the
defendant's conduct or consented to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the
capital felony committed by another person and
his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress
or under the substantial domination of another
person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of Jaw was substantially impaired.

(g) The age of the defendant, at the time of the
crime."
·

§_/

·~

F 1 a . Stat . Ann . § 9 21. 141 ( 4 )

- 3 -

( 19 7 3 ) .

As the

Supreme Court of Florida said in State v. Dixon,

Fla.

283 So. 2d 1, 10 (1973), "Review by this Court guarantees that
the reasons present in one

cas~

will reach a similar result to

that reached under similar circumstances in another case . . . .
If a defendant is sentenced to die, this Court can review that
case in light of the other decisions and determine whether or
not the punishment is too great."
It was under this statute that petitioner was tried, found
guilty and sentenced to death for the first degree murder of Joel
Ronnie Medgebow.

The circumstances surrounding the murder itself.

were testified to by Patricia Medgebow, the decedent's wife,

.

7/

who was present at the time of the murder.-

She , and her husband

had gone to sleep in the bedroom of their apartment, but Mrs.
Medgebow had wakened several times during the night.
again around 5:00 a.m.
moaning.

She wakened

to find her husband sitting . up in bed,

He was holding what she took to be a ruler.

Just then a

third person jumped up and hit her several times in the face,
knocking her to the floor.
the living room.

The intruder then ran out through

.

Mrs. Medgebow was . not able to identify the

attacker, although she was able to give a description of his
clothing.

~/

After the intruder left, Mrs. Medgebow turned on the

light and saw that her husband had been stabbed.

sh·e attempted

to give him artificial respiration and cardiac massage, then
across the hall and wakened a neighbor.

ran

Later the police and an

ambulance were called.

ll

The murder occurred on July 10, 1973.

8/ She described the attacker as wearing light pants and a
p1n stripe shirt with long sleeves rolled up to the elbow.
She
also stated that the attacker was a medium sized male.

- 4 -
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The post-mortem examination showed that Medgebow had been
killed by a single stab wound into the heart, causing shock
and compression of the heart as . the pericardium filled with
blood.
Petitioner was connected to the crime as a result of a
telephone call to the police made by his wife later in the
morning of July 10.

She testified that on the night before the
short-sleeved
murder, petitioner had gone to work dressed in a/White shirt,
with his company's name on it, and gray pants.

He returned

at about 5:15 a.m. dressed in the same shirt and pants but
with no shoes.

Petitioner had some conversation with his wife

at this time, packed his clothes and left.

He was later arrested

in Connecticut.
A young woman, _Mary Bassett, and her infant daughter
boarding with the Bassetts.

were

From her bedroom, Mrs. Bassett over-

heard parts of petitioner's conversation with his wife.

She

testified that petitioner said .he had stabbed and killed a man
with a butcher knife while he was burglarizing a place, and that
he had beaten a woman.
Small amounts of human blood were found on the petitioner's
Maas Brothers shirt, but the quantity was too small to type.
No fingerprints were found on the murder weapon.
A co-worker of petitioner testified that they had been drinkin g
together until 3:30 or 3:45a.m., that petitioner had driven him
horne, had conversed with him briefly, and left.

Petitioner at

this time was wearing the same gray pants and white shirt he wore
. back to his mobile horne at 5:15.
The jury found the defendant guilty as charged.

During the

punishment phase of the ?ifurcated proceeding, it was shown that
the defendant had one prior conviction, a 1967 charge of breaking
and entering without permission.

- . 5-

-s!..' '-

~

The State also introduced the

---------c,;,-\;7.

' ;;;~~---, o cr-----------------------.-----------~

evidence of

Dr. James Crumbley, the doctor at the jail

where petitioner was held pending trial.

Dr. Crumbley

testified that petitioner had come to him as a physician, and
told him that he (the petitioner) was concerned that he would
do--damage_ to other people in the future, that he had had an
uncontrollable desire to kill which had resulted in his killing
one man, that he could feel this desire building up again, and
that he wanted the doctor to get him some psychiatric help so
he would not kill

again~

The doctor also testified that in

his opinion the petitioner was dangerous

and would be a danger

to his fellow inmates if imprisoned, but petitioner's condition
could be treated so that he would no longer be dangerous.
Dr. Crumbley also testified that in his opinion the petitioner
was under an extreme mental disturbance at the time the crime
was committed.
The jury returned an advisory verdict recommending
the sentence of death be imposed.

that

The judge ordered an inde-

pendent psychiatric evaluation of petitioner, the results of
which indicated that the petitioner was not, then or at the
time of the murder, mentally impaired.
sentenced petitioner to death.

The trial judge then

In his written findings in

support of the sentence, the judge found as aggravating circumstances (1) that the murder was premeditated and occurred in the
course of a felony (burglary);
propensity to commit murder;

(2) that the petitioner has the

(3) that the murder was especially

heinous, atrocious, and cruel; and (4) that the defendant knowingl y
through his intentional act created a great risk of serious
bodily harm and death to many persons.

The trial judge also

specifically found that none of the enumerated mitigating circumstances existed
affirmed.

in this case.

The Supreme Court of Florida

Proffitt v. State, 315 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1975).

)
I
- 6 -
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PROFFITT v. FLORIDA
Capital Case - The Florida Statute

The Florida statute like the federal and Texas statutes,
authorizes capital punishment only after consideration of both
"aggravating" and "mitigating" circumstances.
system is not as carefully structured.

But the Florida

It allows the jury to

"balance" factors on both sides and permits a recommendation
of death even when there is a "mitigating" factor.
The bifurcated system operates with the same judge and
jury.

Any relevant evidence, even if otherwise inadmissible,

may be introduced during the sentencing phase.

The jury may

consider eight "aggravating" and seven "mitigating" circumstances similar to those found in Texas.
The jury must decide (i) whether there are sufficient
aggravating circumstances, (ii) whether there are sufficient
mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances; and (iii) whether life imprisonment or death is the
appropriate sentence.
The jury may recommend, but the decision as to sentencing
is left to the judge.
As pointed out in State v. Dixon (283 So. 2d 1) (the
first decision by the Supreme Court of Florida under the
new statute), the trial judge must justify his sentence in
writing:

.

·,-;",

'

2.
"The fourth step required by Fla. Stat. § 921.141,
F.S.A., is that the trial judge justifies his
sentence of death in writing, to provide the
opportunity for meaningful review by this Court.
Discrimination or capriciousness cannot stand where
reason is required, and this is an important element
added for the protection of the convicted defendant.
Not only is the sentence then open to judicial review
and correction, but the trial judge is required to
view the issue of life or death within the framework
of rules provided by the statute." 283 So. 2d 1 at 8.
In Dixon, addressing whether the death sentence would
be imposed in one situation and not in another, the Court said:
" • . . Review by this Court guarantees that the
reasons present in one case will reach a similar
result to that reached under similar circumstances
in another case. No longer will one man die and
another live on the basis of race, or a woman live
and a man die on the basis of sex. If a defendant
is sentenced to die, this Court can review that case
in light of the other decisions and determine whether
or not the punishment is too great." 283 So. 2d at 10.

--

I

r~~ ~-!u-14 l-v ~- . ~

~~ - 4-.- ~ ~ - ~0

-

__ ..

-

--·- --·

,..__

~

..

~-·

..

--

-

------~

.,__

-

----- -

_
Me. __ ~~~~ -+<'... ~r ~-~- ~~- · - ,;~_ ~~ ·---- - - - - ---·---

...· ,

I

[

.

!~ ..

-

- --

-

~~~~~'[?~ --

~ ~~~..(j
- lf7Z.

'1

-

· - ----- --.---

~ ~.t{/4k.J ~ --~

~/-..rv-J~''(~!) . _s~ _

~_e.._.... ..,.

--

•

---

-

----- --

--

t2.v

~A ~

J. ..\... j

•

T -~ -_ .., -r,-~~ -

~~ ~

t

- - - - - - - - --- --- - · -

-~dAAJ ~t~ -

- --- ~~- ~ ~)~ ~ ~ M;&, __

- -- ~ ~ Jz-1 ~ ~ .,.l.IIC, «..fl. ~ ~ - .
. - -- ~.a.~--~ - ~ ~ .a~- ~ -----~-
-

~~ ~- ~ A..I.JI~,
:

-

-~ (~ ~~P~ - ~ --

-!

~~~,~~. 7M-'~~¥~)
.

I

- -

.

~

-

---- - -- -

-

-

I
-- --- - I

~ ~
----~.
~~-. It<<::. ~ t~---- -~ H-e- ~);;;;~ "'( ~ _12-L:;.~__. - ---uJ)

I

I
1

I
I
I
~~ -~ -----•

~

i

'

I

-

'7 -

--

-----

---

~~
~ ----k
~~(~ ~7'~~ UAA.~.,-- ~~-- ~~
)-

C/!1

--

-=-=~1- ~---==-~ ==-~=------ -__
-----___ - I

-

i
-

_i
I

- ---- --

-- - - -·

-- - - - . -

---

---

-- - I

I

-

-- -- - - - -- -- -

I

- I

---------- ----- ---- --------- - - - -

II--- - ---- -- ·- - ---- - - - -- - -

I

----- ---J

- - - ---- - - - - -

I

!

- -

!

-

{_-,I'II".AAC....,.._..~~"'---'-

·_

~ ~-. ~

~ 1971- ~.

----

-

-

-- -

--- · - - -

------·

~- ~·---

112- t/~~ ~ ~ ~~.J L~
-

------ ---

---

- ,.~..-..:o;."""-C-~i'Y

~ triiV
-

~-

-·

~-

~~~~~~~~
-

--~-----

~~4~·---

(S;A.. ~ ~~,;::: - 4 ~ .. 't: '9? ~!) -·-_- --_
~~~-~~15"~ ~ 1/1::::::.-- ~;::::;: ::4<.:-: )
.

~ ~~~h...~-~. ---~ ?<.0 ~ ~ ~/f? ~ ~
,;-c.~~·...........~~ U44A.«=w/~ ~.
Cta""'C-1T
~ 'A..,/-;44~~~\· ...&~~~

J

-

1

~~~~A- ~.,.,;..,_~,_ • ....., ~~-· -

~ _ ~ ~ ~~. r'::!- ~L~)

jt-/-

_'

____ k

~"'1 ~- UAA44.S.--t.c•_.J_

'-c ~ ~ ---- _

~ • - ~ ~ ,..,c.: :c·r4
,t.._ ~ ~-f,~ ~ VLt_t, 5_~I~

7J<-<.. 1 -- -~-- 1-~~ ~ ~<~ i ,_~--.;._;::::. ..~, ~ .------

~I .,L

A-0

~ ~ J-t ;._;

_I I:;::~~~~ __ -_
~, ~k ~ ~

~ .

- -

--

- -

'%(,

c_._ >LL

d'- __

_

--- - - -- - - - --

-

-

--

---• ......

-.:..

____

__....

Qfltltrl ttf t!rt 'Jlttittb _ihtttg
jira.alp:ttghm. ~. '!f. 2ll&f'!~

~ttpTtUU

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 29, 1976

Re:

No. 75-5706 - Proffitt v. Florida

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

Mr. : Justice White
Copies to the Conference

' - Mr. Justice
Mr. Justice
Mr. Justi.ce
Mr. Justice
Mr. Justice
Mr. Justice

Stew:.J.rt
White
Marshall
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens

Rrom: Mr.. Justice Blackmun

C1rc~lated:
· No. 75-5706

-

Proffitt ·v. Florida

Recirculated: ___________

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.

I concur in the result.

C.,/:J9jZ6

/

See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.

238, 405-414 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and id., at 375,

414 and 465.

----~~-----------------~-------------------------~~ ~-~·

• This case, here on certiorari to the Supreme Court
of Florida, presents the challenge to the capital punishment statute of that state.
As the Justices who have preceded me({ave stated,
,)

~

the threshold question - the fundamental one - presented

----..,-

...,..- ......

__.....

..

in all five of these cases is as follows:

......---.,

Whether the punishment of death for the

crime of_murder/is,/under all circumstances,/
"cruel and unusual" in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution?
If we had answered this question in the affirmative,
it would be unnecessary to consider the statutes and
procedures in the five states.

/].s

has ~dicated;] ·

~ .s;even members of the Court Ferconcl~that
capital punishment is

~

unconstitutional per

~·

Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, has summarized his reasons for
agreeing with this conclusion.

J

I now speak for Justices Stewart, Stevens and myself.

~n our joint opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, p. 11-30, we
~:a~e ....t;.he.-recmons.:-re.-~en

iR tnis

~·

~t:v ~~ ~,._. ~ l'~
~_/~4fi

~~~~~- .

w~~~~~pC
~~/~~)

We i?corporate ~y

opinions filed by

re~~enc"§ :~he;e reason~in
the three of ~n !ac~ of

the joint

the other

four cases.

Court ~extending over many
principles: ~e Eighth Amendment

The precedents of this
~

•

I

years, .· establish guiding
I

is

~t

'\

a static

.-

,

-------~

concept./'rl¥~draws

its meaning from/('the

evolvlng standards of d:cency 1that mark the progress of a
maturing society".

1
A penalty must not involve the

unnecessary/ 'nd wanton / infliction of pain.

Nor can it be

I

substantially out of proportion to the severity of the
crime.

As long as the penalty specified by the legislature

comports with these criteria, we must defer to the judgment
of the elected representatives of the

people~

~ri-c., ~

/~

·~.

No one can doubt that the death penalty was

contemplated~when the Constitutio~ was adopted.

It was

a traditional penaltll'b oth in the colonies and in England.
The text of the Fifth Amendment, reiterated in part in

the Fourteenth

Amendm~~,P~~~~~he

capital punishment.

acceptance of

And, in the nearly two centuries of

our national existence~until 1972-~this Court -

I

ll
I

repeatedli,~nd often expressly, j recognized that capital
punishment is not invalid per se.

In Trop v. Dulles,

19~~

~-

Chief Justice Warren - in

the same opinion in which he spoke of "evolving standards
of decency" - noted:
" . • . the death penalty has been emP,loyed
throughout our history, ' d in a day,f when it
is still widely accepted, it cannot~e said
to violate the constitutional concept of
cruelty."
The first major challenge to the per se validity of
capital punishment reached this Court in 1972 in Furman
I

.:

{-"'d#.

,;;}'~(_

v. Georgia. ! As Mr. Justice Stewart has indicated,r although
/~

the issue was there strongly presented, it was not resolved

.

'

by the Court.

Four Justices would have held that capital

'

.

punishment is not invalid; two would have reached the
opposite conclusion; and three Justices, while agreeing.
that the statutes then before the Court were invalid as
·applied, left . open the question whether such punishment
may ever be imposed. "·;
,.....

The principal argument~resented by petitioners in
FurmanJ'as that standards of decency had evolved to the
poin~where

capital punishment was no longer tolerated.

It was said then/that the Eighth Amendment must be
construed finallyJ'as prohibiting capital punishment for
any crime - regardless of its depravit~and impact on
'·

society.

/

L

~--

~~>- ~t

. Petitioners in the five ~s"\'day/renewed the

"standard of decency argument".

ButAdevelopments during

the four years since Furman have undercut substantially~
the assumptions upon which that argument was advanced .
Objective criteria demonstrate;lhat prevailing
standards in our

countr~do

not reject capital punishment,

at least as a sanction in some cases.
The most marked

indicatio~f

of the death penalty for
to Furman.

~e~s

society's endorsement
the legislative response

The legislatures of ~t least 35 states,J'and

the Congress of the United States/have enacted new statutes
that provide for this penalty - at least for some murders.
The jurylalso is a reliable objective index of
~~ ~ • .'1
-.;~
~
~~~--...,.~
contemporary valu;;;,~,.ej~is .,. ~ifeCCi.f -involved, ~
Since Furman,jand under the new statutesy'juries have

~~

imposed the death penalty in more than 400 cases.
But the Eighth Amendment demands more;{han a finding
that a challenged punishment~is acceptable to contemporary
society.

lI

As noted above, a penalty may not be substantially

out of proportio;/to the severity of the crime;jnor may

it be totally without pe~logical justification,j~that
i~14;.....in,.g:r--at'tt~&~li'S.Q.o"~-su.f:fe:d!ng.

w~~/2.41,~

~ (AA-~~
~

5.
We cannot say that the infliction of deathj'as a

punishment for murde;lis without justification.

In part,

capital punishment is an expression of society's

belief~

that certain crimes are so
that the

grievo~an

~adequate r~medy;{s

affront to humanity//

the penalty of death.

In part,;tapital punishment also reflects a legis-

lative judgment;{hat the sanction is necessary to deter
capital crimes.

There is no concl~e empiric data~

either proving or disprovin~the value of the penalty as

I

a deterrent.

We may assume that there are murders,/such

0

-

as those committed in the heat of passion,jfor which the

deat~has

threat of

little or no deterrent effect.

But

there are others;(e·&·, those that are deliberately planned
in advarice,jwhere the penalty may_well~;la deterring
factor.

And, in some cases - such as murder by a life

prisoner - there is no other adequate sanction.

l

I

The evaluation of the unresolved debate concerning
deterrence/properly rests with the legislatures.

They ~~ -

~ C4jl 6<~ ~ ~ ~~

have a flexibilit~and,a~~h~unavailable to the

·

judiciary.
It is well to remember/that we are concerned in

I

these case;l~nl4 with the imposition of capital punishment

~/-t.Jc_ ~ ~
~-

~

for

~he

crime of murder.

We conclude/when a life has been taken
that the punishment of
to that crime.

deliberatel~

deat~is ~t invariably disproportionate

It is an extreme

s:~tion,/suitablejfor the

most extreme of crimes.

****
I come now, briefly, to the Florida case.

I will

not state the facts;'beyond saying that petitioner - in
the course of an unlawful entry into a home at night stabbed to death his sleeping victim- and beat the victim's

wife~The

Florida statute, in all material respects/provides

the same safeguards as the Georgia statut,ldescribed

b~

Mr.

Justice Stewart.
There is a bifurcated procedure.

After the jury

found petitioner guilty, a separate hearing was

hel~to

determine whether the sentence should be death;br life
imprisonment.

The Florida statute requires consideration
I
of specified aggravatingj and mitigating circumstances.
Acting in light of these,J'the jury recommended the sentence
of death.

The trial judge then imposed that sentence,

identifying in writing four of the statutory aggravating
'·

circumstances.
Again as in Georgia, automatic review by the Florida
Supreme Court is required by statute,/and that court

I

~~

y

.
~9evalfiates the sentence to insure consistency among
A

similar cases.
For reasons more fully stated in our
conclude that these

safeguard~provide

op~n~on,

we

the procedural

protection/that prevent the "wanton" and "freakish"
imposition of capital punishmen

t-1 that ~.~.....t.~
weA~ unconstitu-

7

tional in Furman v. Georgia.
~

~;rding· ly )we"'8ffit!tF th

I

-:fudgment ·uf· the .Supreme

Cotl'.t"t·· of -..FloridA.

I
..

l

I
l

j

~

~

~ Jl
/'ltrv :J.., ;J ~. .~~~~~-v ct.- :lt4 ;J.- fit,'~,_, r;

~ /-cJ!,uQ d::~...,>"JI(;-#j'W-Ij. ~If.., ,

11

t.f

~------~---~-~--------...~-~-- IYl

·.

J'lD

:co Stewart

M.r . J u:-:J t ice 1Ia·"sh1.ll
Mr. Junt~ce Bl1.ckmun

~ Just; ice Po ,,1 u

M . Ju~ttco R0~nquis t

~~
lstfDRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

l

No. 75- 5706
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Charles William Proffitt,
Petitioner,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
Supreme Court of Florida.
State of Florida.
[June - , 1976]
, MR. JusTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHJEF JusTIC!I
and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the
judgment.
There is no need to repeat the statement of the facts
of this case and of the statutory procedure under which
the death penalty was imposed, both of which are described in detail in the opinion of MR. JusTICE STEWART,
MR. JusTICE PowELL, and MR. JusTICE STEVENS (hereinafter the plurality). I agree with the plurality, see
Part 2 (a) and (b), ante, a t - , that although the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances are not
susceptible to mechanical application they are by no
means so vague and overbroad as to leave the discretion
of the sentencing authority unfettered. Under Florida
law, the sentencing judge is required to impose the death
penalty on all first-degree murderers as to whom the
statutory aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
factors. There is good reason to anticipate, then , that
as to certain categories of murderers, the penalty will not
be imposed freakishly or rarely but will be imposed with
regularity; and consequently it cannot be said that the
death penalty in Florida as to those categories has
peased "to be a credible deterrent or measurably to contribute to any other end of punishment in the crimiqal
justice system." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 311
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. (concurring opinion). Accordingly, the Florida statutory scheme for imposing the death penalty does not run
afoul of this Court's holding in Furman v. Georgia, supra ..,
For the reasons set forth in my concurriQg opinion in
Gregg v. Georgia, ante, at - , this conclusion is rot
undercut by the possibility that some murderers may'
escape the death penalty solely through exercise of prose- .
cutorial discretipn or executive clemency. For the r~a
sons set forth ·in my dissenting opinion in Roberts v.
Louisiana, pqst, at - , I also reject petitioner's argument that under the Eighth Amendment the death pen..-)
alty may never pe imposed under ltllY circumstances...
l concur in the iudgment of affirmance,.

.§u:pt"ttttt Qfou.rt of tqt 'Jllttittb ~tatts
Jfasqmghm. ~.
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.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 30, 1976

Dear Chief,
Can the Confer'e nce tomorrow be at 2:30p.m.
instead of 2:00p.m.? I have a luncheon engagement
that will make it difficult for me to be back in the building before 2:30p.m.
Sincerely yours,
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The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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No. 75-5706
Cil

Charles W~l~iam Proffitt,]
.
.
B&u
Petitioner,
On Wnt of Certwran to the
v.
Supreme Court of Florida.
State of Florida.
[July 2, 1976]
Opinion of MR. JusTICE STEWART, MR. JusTICE PowELL,
and MR. JusTICE STE;VENS announcing the judgment of
the Court, delivered by MR. JusTICE PowELL.
The issue presented by this case is whether the imposition of the sentence of death for the crim~ of murder
under the law of Florida violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
I
The petitioner, Charles William Proffitt, was tried,
found guilty, and sentenced to death for the first-degree
murder of Joel Medgebow. The circumstances surrounding the murder were testified to by the decedent's wife,
who was present at the time it was committed. On
July 10, 1973, Mrs. Medgebow awakened around 5 a. m.
in the bedroom of her apartment to find her husband
sitting up in bed, moaning. He was holding what she
took to be a ruler. 1 Just then a third person jumped
up, hit her several times with his fist, knocked her to
the floor, and ran out of the house. It soon appeared
that Medgebow had been fatally stabbed with a butcher
knife. Mrs. Medgebow was not able to identify the at1 It appears that the "ruler" was actually the murder weapon
which Medgebow had pulled from his own chest.

lS
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tacker, although she was able to give a description of
him.2
The petitioner's wife testified that on the night before
the murder the petitioner had gone to work dressed in
a white shirt and gray pants, and that he had returned
at about 5: 15 a. m. dressed in the same clothing but
without shoes. She said that after a short conversation the petitioner had packed his clothes and departed.
A young woman boarder, who overheard p~trts of the
petitioner's conversation with his wife, testified that the
petitioner had told his wife that he had stabbed and
killed a man with a butcher knife while he was burglarizing a place, and that he had beaten a woman. One
of the petitioner's coworkers testified that they had been
drinking together until 3:30 or 3:45 a. m. on the morning of the murder and that the petitioner had then
driven him home. He said that the petitioner at this
time was wearing gray pants and a white shirt.
The jury found the defendant guilty as charged. Subsequently, as provided by Florida law, a sepa.rate hearing
was held to determine whether the petitioner should be
sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. Under the
state law that decision turned on whether certain statutory aggravating circumstances surrounding the crime
outweighed any statutory mitigating circumstances found
to exist.3 At that hearing it was shown that the petitioner had one prior conviction, a 1967 charge of breaking
and entering. The State also introduced the testimony
of the physician at the jail where the petitioner had been
held pending trial, Dr. Crumbley. He testified that the
petitioner had come to him as a physician, and told him
that he was concerned that he would harm other people
She described the attacker as wearing light pants and a pinstriped shirt w1th long sleeves rolled up to the elbow. She also
stated that the attacker was a medium-sized white ma~e .
~ Soo pp. 5-7, infra.
2

,Jo;'

I

I
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in the future, that he had had an uncontrollable desire
to kill that had already resulted in his killing one man,
that this desire was building up again, and that he
wanted psychiatric help so he would not kill again. Dr.
Crumbley also testified that, in his opinion, the petitioner
was dangerous and would be a danger to his fellow
inmates if imprisoned, but that his condition could be
treated successfully.
The jury returned an advisory verdict recommending
the sentence of death. The trial judge ordered an independent psychiatric evaluation of the petitioner, the
results of which indicated that the petitioner was not,
then or at the time of the murder, mentally impaired.
The judge then sentenced the petitioner to death . In
his written findings supporting the sentence, the judge
found as aggravating circumstances that ( 1) the murder
was premeditated and occurred in the course of a felony
(burglary); (2) the petitioner has the propensity to
commit murder; (3) the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, and cruel; and ( 4) the petitioner knowingly,
through his intentional act, created a great risk of serious
bodily harm &nd death to mltny persons. The jud~e
also found specifica.lly that none of the statutory mitigating circumstances existed. The Supreme Court of
Floridlt affirmed. Proffitt v. State, 315 So.. 2d 461
(1975). We granted certiorari, U. S. - , to consider whether the imposition of the death sentence in
this case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
II
The petitioner argues that the imposition of the death
penalty under any circumstances is cruel and unt.Jsual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. We reject this argument for the reasons
stated today in Gregg v. Geor(Jia, ante, pp. 11- 30.
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III
A

In response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238
( 1972), the Florida Legislature adopted new statutes that
authorize the imposition of the death penalty on those
convicted of first-degree murder. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.04
(1) (Supp. 197&-1977) .4 At the same time Florida
adopted a new capital-sentencing procedure, patterned
in large part on the Model Penal Code. See § 921.141
(Supp. 197&-1977) .5 Under the new statute, if a defendant is found guilty of a capital offense, a separate evidentiary hearing is held before the trial judge and jury
to determine his sentence. Evidence may be presented
on any matter the judge deems relevant to sentencing
The murder statute under which petitioner was convicted reads
as follows:
"(1) (a) The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated
from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed
or any human being, or when committed by a person engaged in
the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate, any arson,
involuntary sexual battery, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft
piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb, or which resulted from the unlawful distribution of
heroin by a person 18 years of age or older when such drug is
proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user, shall be
murder in the first degree and shall constitute a capital felony,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082.
"(b) In all cases under this section, the procedure set forth in
s. 921.141 shall be followed in order to determine sentence of death
or life imprisonment." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.04 (Supp. 1976-1977) .
Another Florida statute authorizes imposition of the death penalty
upon conviction of sexual battery of a child under 12 years of
age. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.011 (2) (Supp. 1976--1977) . We do not
in this opinion consider the constitutionality of the death penalty
for any offense other than first-degree murder.
5 Compare Model Penal Code § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft,
1962) (set out in Gregg v. Georgia, ante, p. 36 n. 42).
4
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and must include matters relating to certain legislatively
specified aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
Both the prosecution and the defense may present argu~
ment on whether the death penalty shall be imposed.
At the conclusion of the hearing the jury is directed
to consider " [ w] hether sufficient mitigating circumstances
exist . . . which outweigh aggravating circumstances
found to exist; and .. . fb] ased on those considerations,
whether the defendant should be sentenced to life [im·
prisonment] or death." §§ 921.141 (2)(b)-(c) (Supp.
1976-1977).6 The jury's verdict is determined by maThe aggravating circumstances are:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence
of imprisonment.
"(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital
felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
person.
" (c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many
persons.
"(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was
engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt
to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or air~
craft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb.
"(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding
or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
"(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
"(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the
lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement
of laws.
"(h) The capital felony was especia.lly heinous, atrocious, or cruel.''
The mitigating circumstances are:
6

'

1

"(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal
activity.
"(b) The capita.! felony was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
[Footnote 6 is continued on p. 6]
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jority vote. It is only advisory; the actual sentence is
determined by the trial judge. The Florida Supreme
Court has stated, however, that "[i]n order to sustain a
sentence of death following a jury recommendation of
life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be
so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910
(1975). Accord, Thompson v. State, 328 So. 2d 1, 5
(1976). Cf. Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666, 671
( 1975) .7
The trial judge is also directed to weigh the statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances when he determines the sentence to be imposed on a defendant.
The statute requires that if the trial court imposes a
sentence of death, "it shall set forth in writing its findings
upon which the sentence of death is based as to the facts:
(a) [t]hat sufficient [statutory] aggravating circumstances exist . . . and (b) [ t] hat there are insufficient
·''(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or
consented to the act.
1
' (d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively
minor.
"·(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.
"(f) The capacity of the deft>ndant to appreciate the crimmality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was substantially impaired.
"(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime." § 921.141
(6) (Supp. 1976-1977).
7
Tedder has not always been cited when the Florida Court has
considered a judge-imposed death sentence followmg a jury recommE>ndation of life imprisonment. See, e. g., Thompson v. State,
328 So. 2d 1 (1976); Douglas v. State, 328 So. 2d 18 (1976) ;
Dobbert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (1976). But in the latter case
two judges relied on Tedder in separate opmions, one in support
of reversing the death sentence and one in support of affirmjng 1t.
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[statutory] mitigating circumstances ... to outweigh the
aggravating circumstances." § 921.141 (a) (Supp. 1976·1977) .8
The statute provides for automatic review by hte Supreme Court of Florida. of all cases in which a dea.t h
sentence has been imposed. § 921.141 (4) (Supp. 19761977). The law differs from that of Georgia in that it does
not require the court to conduct any specific form of review. Since, however, the trial judge must justify the
imposition of death sentence with written findings, meaningful appellate review of each such sentence is made possible, and the Supreme Court of Florida, like its Georgia.
counterpart, considers its function to be to "guarantee ...
that the [aggravating and mitigating] reasons present in
one case will reach a, similar result to that reached under
similar circumstances in another case. . . . If a defendant is sentenced to die, this Court can review that case
in light of the other decisions and determine whether or
not the punishment is too great." State v. Dixon, 283
So. 2d 1, 10 (1973).
On their face these procedures, like those used in
Georgia, appear to meet the constitutional deficiencies
identified in Furman. The sentencing authority in
8 In one case the Florida Court upheld a death sentence where
the trial judge had simply listed six aggravating factors as justification for the sentence he imposed. Sawyer v. State, 313 So. 2d 680
(1975). Since there were no mitigating factors, and since some of
these aggravating fa.ctors arguably fell within the statutory categories, it is unclear whether the Florida Court would uphold a
dea.th sentence that rested entirely on nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances. It seems unlikely that it would do so, since the
capital-sentencing statute explicitly provides that "[a]ggravating
circumstances shall be limited to tP.e following [eight specified
factors.]." § 921.141 (5) (Supp. 1976-1977). (Emphasis added.)
There is no such limiting language introducing the list of st11-tutory
mitigating factors. See § 921.141 (6) (Supp. 1976-1977) . See also
n. 14, infra.
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Florida, the trial judge, is directed to weigh eight aggra·
vating factors against seven mitigating factors to determine whether the death penalty shall be imposed. This
determination requires the trial judge to focus on the
circumstances of the crime and the character of the individual defendant. He must, inter alia, consider whether
the defendant has a prior criminal record, whether the
defendant acted under duress or under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, whether the
defendant's role in the crime was that of a minor accomplice, and whether the defendant's youth argues in favor
of a more lenient sentence than might otherwise be
imposed. The trial judge must ~lso determine whether
the crime was committed in the course of one of several
enumerated felonies, whether it was committed for
pecuniary gain, whether it was committed to assist in
an escape from custody or to prevent a lawful arrest,
and whether the crime was especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel, To answer these questions, which are not unlike those considered by a Georgia sentencing jury, compare Gregg v. State, ante, p. 40, the sentencing judge
must focus on the individual circumstances of each homicide and each defendant.
The basic difference between the Florida system and
the Georgia system is that in Florida the sentence is
determined by the tria.l judge rather than by the jury. 9
This Court has pointed out that jury sentencing in a
capital case can perform an important societal function,
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 519 n. 15, but it
9

Because the trial judge imposes sentence, the Florida court has
ruled that he may order preparation of a presentence mvestigation
report to assist him in determining the appropriate sentence. See
Swan v. State, 322 So. 2d 485, 488-489 (1975) ; Songer v. State, 322
So. 2d 481, 484 (1975). These reports frequPntly contain much
mformation relevant to sentencing. See Gregg v. Georgia, ante,
p. 32 n. 37.
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has never suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required. And it would appear that judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater consistency in
the imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to impose
sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.' 0
The Florida capital-sentencing procedures thus seek to
a.ssure that the death penalty will not be imposed in an
arbitrary or capricious manner. Moreover, to the extent
that any risk to the contrary exists, it is minimized by
Florida's appella.t e· review system, under which the evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is
reviewed and reweighed by the Supreme Court of Florida
"to determine independently whether the imposition of
the ultimate penalty is warranted." Songer v. State, 322
So. 2d 481 , 484 (1975). See also Sullivan v. State, 303.
So. 2d 632, 637 (1974). The Supreme Court of Florida,
like that of Georgia, has not hesitated to vacate a death
sentence when it has determined that the sentence
should not have been imposed. Indeed , it has vacated
eight of the 21 death sentences that it has reviewed to
date. See Taylor v. State, 294 So. 2d 648 (1974); LaMadline v. State, 303 So. 2d 17 (1974); Slater v. State,
316 So. 2d 539 (1974); Swan v. State, 322 So. 2d 485
(1975); Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (1 975 ); Halli10

See ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives &
Proced-u res § 1.1 , Commentary, pp. 43-48; President 's Comm'n on
Law Enforcement & Administration of Justice: The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society, Task Force Report: The Cou rts 26 (1967).
See also Gregg v. Georgia, ante, pp. 51- 52. In the words of t heo
Florida. Court, "a. trial judge with experience in t he facts of
criminality possesses the requisite knowledge to balance t he facts of
the case against the stand-a rd criminal activity which can only be
developed by involvement with the trials of numerous defendant::;."'
&ate v. Dixon, 283 So. 20:, at 8.
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weU v. State, 323 So. 2d 557 (1975); Thomp·son v. State,
328 So. 2d 1 (1976); Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137·
(1976).
Under Florida's capital-sentencing procedures, in sum,
trial judges are given specific and detailed guidance to
assist them in deciding whether to impose a death penalty or imprisonment for life. Moreover, their decisions
are reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with
other sentences imposed in similar circumstances. Thus,
in Florida, as in Georgia, it is no longer true that there
is " 'no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many
cases where it is not.'" Gregg v. Georgia, ante, p. 31,
quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 313 (WHITE,
J., concurring). On its face the Florida system thus
satisfies the constitutional deficiencies identified in
Furman.
B

As in Gregg, the petitioner contends, however, that,
while perhaps facially acceptable, the new sentencing·
procedures in actual effect are merely cosmetic, and that
arbitrariness and caprice still pervade the system under
which Florida imposes the death penalty.
(1)

The petitioner first argues that arbitr:ariness is inherent
in the Florida criminal justice system because it allows
discretion to be exercised a.t each stage of a criminal
proceeding-the prosecutor's decision whether to charge
a capital offense in the first place, his decision whether
to accept a plea to a lesser offense, the jury's consideration of lesser included offenses, and, after conviction and
unsuccessful appeal, the Executive's decision whether to
commute a death sentence. As we noted in Gregg, this
argument is based on a fundamental misinterpretation
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of Furman, and we reject it for the reasons expressed in
Gregg. See ante, pp. 41-42.,
(2)

The petitioner next argues that the new Florida sentencing procedures in re~lity do not eliminate the arbitrary infliction of death that was condemned in Furman.
Basically he contends that the statutory aggravating and
mitigating circumstances are vague and overbroad,11 and
that the statute gives no guidance as to how the mitigating and aggravating circumstances should be weighed
in any specific case.
(a)
Initially the petitioner asserts that the enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances are so vague and
so broad that "virtually any first degree murder convict
[is] a candidate for a death sentence." In particular,
the petitioner att~cks the eighth and third statutory aggravating circumstances, which authorize the death penalty to be imposed if the crime ~s "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel," or if " [ t] he defendant knowingly
created a great risk of death to many persons." § 921.141
(5)(h), (c) (Supp. 1976-1977). These provisions must
be considered as they have been construed by the Supreme Court of Florida.
That Court has recognized that while it is arguable
"that all killings are atrocious, . . . [s]till we believe
that the Legislature intended something 'especially'
heinous, atrocious, or cruel when it authorized the death
n As in Gregg, we examine the claims of vagueness and overbreadth in the statutory criteria only insofar as it is necessary to
determine whether there is a substantial risk that the Florida
capital-sentencing system, when viewed in its entirety, will result
in the capricious or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. See
Gregg v. G'eorgta, ante, p. 43 n. 51.

·."
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penalty for first degree murder." T~dder v. State, 322
So. 2d 908, 910 (1975). As a consequence, the Court
has indicated that the eighth statutory provision is directed only at "the conscienceless or pitiless crime which
is unnecessarily torturous to the victim." State v. Dixon,
283 So. 2d 1, 9 (1973). See also Alford v. State, 307 So.
2d 433, 445 ( 1975); Halliwell v. State, 323 So. 2d 557,
561 (1975.).12 We cannot say that the provision, as so
construed, provides inadequate guidance to those charged
with the duty of recommending or imposing sentences in
capital cases. See Gregg v. Georgia, ante, pp. 43- 44.
In the only case, exeept for the instant case, in which
the third aggravating factor-"the defendant knowingly
created a great risk of death to many persons"-was
found, Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (1975), the State
S;upreme Court held that the defendant created a great
risk of death because he "obviously murdered two of the
victims in order to avoid a surviving witness to the
[firstl murder." 322 So. 2d, at 540. 1 3 As construed by
2
1. The Supreme Court of Florida has affirmed death sentences in
several cases, including the instant case, where this righth statutory
aggravating factor was found , without specifica lly stating that the
homicide was "pitiless" or "torturous to the victim." See, e. g.,
Hallman v. State , 305 So. 2d 180 (1974) (victim's throat slit with
broken bottle) ; Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666 (1975) ("career
criminal" shot sleeping traveling companion); Gardner v. State, 315
So.2d 675 (1975) (brutal beating and murder ) ; Alvord v. State, 332
So. 2d 533 (1975) (three women killed by strangulation, one raped);
Douglas v. State, 328 So. 2d 18 (1976) (depraved murder); Henry
v. State, 328 So. 2d 430 (1976) (torture murder) ; Dobbert v. State,
328 So. 2d 433 (1976) (torture and killing of two children). But
the circumstances of aU of these cases could accurately be characterized as "pitiless" and "unnecessarily tortuous," and it thus does
not appear that the Florida Court has abandoned the definition
that it announced in Dixon and applied in Alford, Tedder, and
Halliwell.
13
While it might be argued that this case broadens that construction, since only one person other than the victim was attacked at

......
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the Supreme Court of Florida these provisions are not
impermissibly vague. 14
(b)
The petitioner next attacks the imprecision of the mitigating circumstances. He argues that whether a defendant acted "under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance," whether a defendant's capacity "to conform .his conduct to the requirements of
law was substantially impaired," or whether a defendant's participation as an accomplice in a capital felony
was "relatively minor," are questions beyond the capacity
of a jury or judge to determine. See §§ 921.141 (6)(b),
(f), (d) (Supp. 1970-1977).
He also argues that neither a jury nor a judge is caall and then only by being hit with a fist, this would be to read
more into the State Supreme Court's opinion than is actually there.
That Court considered 11 claims of error advanced by the petitioner, including the trial judge's finding that none of the statutory
mitigating circumstances existed. It did not, however, consider
whether the findings as to each of the statutory aggravating circumstances were supported by the evidence. · If only one aggravating circmnstance had been found, or if some mitigating circumstance
had been found to exist but not to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, we would be justified in concluding that the State Supreme
Court had necessarily decided this point even though it bad not
expressly done so. However, in the circumstances of this case, when
four separate aggravating circumstances were found and where each
mitigating circumstance was expressly found not to exist, no such
holding on the part of the State Supreme Court can be implied.
14 The petitioner notes further . that Florida's sentencing system
fails to channel jury or judge discretion because it allows for consideration of nonstatutory aggra.vating factors. In the only case
to approve such a practice, Sawyer v. State, 313 So. 2d 680 (1975),
the Florida Court recast the trial court's six nonstatutory aggravating factors into four aggravating circumstances-two of them statutory. As noted earlier, it is unclear that the Florida Court wou)d
ever approve a death sentence based entirely on nonstatutory aggravating circumsta.nces. See n. 8, supra.
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pable of deciding howe to weigh a defendant's a.ge or de~
termining whether he had a "significant history of prior
criminal activity." See §§ 921.141 (6)(g), (a) (Supp.
1976-1977), In a similar vein the petitioner argues
that it is not possible to make a rational determination
whether there are ''sufficient" aggravating circumstances
that are not outweighed by the mitigating circumstances,
since the state law assigns no specific weight to any of
the various circumstances to be considered. See§ 921.141
(Supp. 1976-1977).
While these questions and decisions may be hard,
they require no more line-drawing than is commonly re~
quired of a fact finder in a lawsuit. For example, juries
have traditionally evaluated the validity of defenses such
a.s insanity or reduced capacity, both of which involve
the same considerations a.s some of the abpve-mentioned
mitigating circumstances. While the various factors to
be considered by the sentencing authorities do not have
numerical weights a.ssigned to them, the requirements
of Fu,rman are satisfied when the sentencing authority's
discretion is guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or agaiqst
imposition of the death penalty, thus eliminating total
arbitrariness and capriciousness in its imposition.
The directions given to judge and jury by the Florida
statute are sufficiently clear and precise to enable the
various aggravating circumstances to be weighed agaiqst
the mitigating ones. As a result, the trial court's sentencing discretion is guided and channeled by a system
.t hat focuses on the citcumstances of each individual
homicide and individu~tl defendant in deciding whether
the death penalty is to be imposed.
(c)
Finally, the Florida statute ha.s a provision designed
to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed

...
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a, capriciously selected group of convicted defendants,
'fhe Supreme Court of Florida reviews each death sen ..
tence to ensure that similar results are reached in sim,
ilar cases. 15
Nonetheless the petitioner attacks the Florida appel..
late review process because the role of the Supreme
Court of Florida in reviewing death sentences is neces..,
sadly subjective and unpredictable. While it may be
true that that Court has not chosen to formulate a rigid
objective test as its standard of review for all cases, it
does not follow that the appellate review process is in~
effective or arbitrary. In fact, it is apparent that the
Florida Court has undertaken responsibly to perform its
function of dea.t h sentence review with a maximum of
rationality and consistency. For example, it has sev~
eral times compared the circumstances of a case under
review with those of previous cases in which it has a~
sessed the imposition of death sentences. See, e. g., Alford v. State, 307 So. 2d 433, 445 (1975); Alvord v. State,
322 So. 2d 533, 540-541 (1975). By following this procedure the Florida Court has in effect adopted the type
of proportionality review mandated by the Georgia statute. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, ante, pp. 47-49. And any
suggestion that the Florida Court engages in only cursory
or rubber stamp review of death penalty cases is totally controverted by the fact that it has vacated over
one-third of the dea.t h sentences that have come before
it. See pp. 9-10, supra. 16
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d, at 10.
The petitioner also argues that since the Florida Court does
not review sentences of life imprisonment imposed in capital oases
or sentences imposed in cases where a capital crime was charged
but where the jury convicted of a lesser offense, it will have an
unbalanced view of the way that the typical jury treats a murder
case and it will affirm death sentences under circmnstances where
the vast majority of judges would have imposed a sentence of life
15

16

75-5706--0PINION

16

PROFFITT v. FLORIDA

IV
Florida, like Georgia, has responded to Furman by
enacting legisla.tion that passes constitutional muster.
That legislation provides that after a person is convicted
.of first-degree murder, there shaH be an informed,
focused, guided, and objective inquiry into the question
whether he should be sentenced to death. If a death
sentence is imposed, the sentencing authority articulates
in writing the statutory reasons that led to its decision.
Those reasons, and the evidence supporting them, are
conscientiously reviewed by a court which, because of
its statewide jurisdiction, can assure consistency, fairness,
and rationality in the evenhanded o eration of the state
law. As in Georgia, this system assurej; that sentences
of death will not be "wantonly" or "freakishly" imposed.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 310 (STEWART, J.,
concurring). Accordingly, the judgment before us is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.

imprisonment. As we noted in Gregg v. Georgia, ante, p. 47 n. 56,
this problem is not sufficient to raise a. serious risk tha.t, the state
capital-sentencing system will result in arbitrary and capricious
imposition of the death penalty,

~
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MR. JUSTICE STEWART, MR. JUSTICE POWELL,

J(p

and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS:
The issue presented by this case is whether the imposition

of the sentence of death for the crime

of murder under the law of Florida violates the Eighth and Fourtee nth Amendments.
I

The petitioner, Charles William Proffitt, was tried,
found guilty and sentenced to death for the first degree murder
by stabbing of Joel MedgeQ.ow. The circumstances surrounding
the murder itself were testified to by the decedent's wife, who

1/
was present at the time of the murder.

Mrs. Medgebow

wakened around 5:00 a.m. to find her husband sitting up in bed,
moaning. Just then a third person jumped up, hit her several
times, knocked her to the floor, and then ran out of the house.
Mrs. Medgebow was not able to identify the attacker, although she

2/
was able to give a description of his clothing.-

i

•:<
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The petitioner was connected to the crime as a result
of a telephone call to the police made by his wife later in the
morning of July 10. She testified that on the night before the
murder, the petitioner had gone to work dressed in a shortsleeved white shirt, with his company's name on it, and gray pants.
He returned at about 5:15 a.m. dressed in the same shirt and
pants but with no shoes. The petitioner had some conversation
with his wife at this time, packed his clothes, and left. He
was later arrested in Connecticut.
A young woman who was boarding with the Proffitts
overheard parts of the petitioner's conversation with his wife.
The woman testified that the petitioner told his wife that he had
stabbed and killed a man with a butcher knife while he was burglarizing a place, and that he had beaten a woman.
Small amounts of human blood were found on the
petitioner's Maas Brothers shirt, but the quantity was too small
for a determination of the blood type. No fingerprints were found
on the murder weapon.
One of the petitioner's co-worker's testified that they
had been drinking together until 3:30 or 3:45 a.m., that the
petitioner had driven him home, had conversed with him briefly,
and left. The petitioner at this time was wearing the same gray
pants and white shirt he wore back to his mobile home at 5:15 a.m.

75-5706, Proffitt
- 3 The jury found the defendant guilty as charged. Sub-

3/
sequently, as provided by Florida law- a separate hearing was
held to determine whether certain statutory aggravating circumstances surrounding the crime outweighed any statutory mitigating

4/
circumstances found to exist- such that the petitioner should be
sentenced to death rather than life imprisonment. At that hearing
it was shown that the petitioner had one prior conviction, a 1967
charge of breaking and entering without permission. The State
also introduced the evidence of the doctor at the jail where the
petiticner was held pending triaL The doctor testified that the
petitioner had come to him as a physician, and told him that he
(the petitioner) was concerned that he would do damage to other
people in the future, that he had had an uncontrollable desire to
kill which had resulted in his killing one man, that he could feel
this desire building up again, and that he wanted the doctor to
get him some psychiatric help so he would not kill again. The
doctor also testified that in his opinion the petitioner was dangerous
and would be a danger to his fellow inmates if imprisoned, but
that the petitioner's condition could be treated so that he would
no longer be dangerous. Dr. Crumbley also testified that in his
opinion the petitioner was under an extreme mental disturbance
at the time the crime was committed.

I
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- 4The jury returned an advisory verdict recommending
that the sentence of death be imposed. The judge ordered an
independent psychiatric evaluation of the petitioner, the results
of which indicated that the petitioner was not, then or at the time
of the murder, mentally impaired. The trial judge then sentenced
the petitioner to death. In his written findings in support of the
sentence, the judge found as aggravating circumstances (1) that
the murder was premeditated and occurred in the course of a
felony (burglary); (2) that the petitioner has the propensity to
commit murder; (3) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel; and (4) that the petitioner knowingly through his
intentional act created a great risk of serious bodily harm and
death to many persons. The trial judge also specifically found
that none of the enumerated mitigating circumstances existed in
this case. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. Proffitt v.
State, 315 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1975). We granted certiorari,
U.S. _ _, to consider whether the imposition of the death
sentence in this case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the E ighth and Fourteenth Amendments .

..

- 5 -

II

The petitioner argues that the imposition of the death
penalty under any circumstances is cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the E ighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We reject
this argument for the reasons stated today in Gregg v. Georgia,
ante, pp. 14-43.
III
A

In response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
the Florida l egislature adopted new statutes that authorize the
imposition of the death penalty on those convicted of first-degree

5/
murder, Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 782.04(1) (Supp. 1976-1977).- At
the same time Florida adopted a new capital-sentencing procedure,
patterned in large part on the Model Penal Code. See § 921.141
6I

-

(Supp. 1976-1977).- Under the new statute, if a defendant is
found guilty of a capital offense, a separate evidentiary hearing
is held before the trial judge and jury to determine his sentence.
Evidence may be presented on any matter the judge deems relevant
to sentences and must include matters relating to certain legislatively
specified aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Both the
state and the defense may present argument on whether the death
penalty shall be imposed.

•',

At the conclusion of the hearing the jury is directed
to consider "[w ]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist .
which outweigh aggravating circumstances found to exist, and . . .
[b ]ased on those considerations, whether the defendant should be
sentenced to life [imprisonment] or death." Fla. Stat. Ann.

§

7/
921.141(2) (1976-1977 Supp. )..

The jury's verdict is determined

by majority vote. It is only advisory; the actual sentence is
determined by the trial judge. The Florida Supreme Court has
stated, however, that "[i]n order to sustain a sentence of death
following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting
a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually
no reasonable person could differ." Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d
908, 910. Accord, Thompson v. State, 328 So. 2d 1, 5. Cf.
- -- -

8

I

Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666, 671.-

The trial judge is also directed to weigh the statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances when he determines
the sentence to be imposed on a defendant. The statute requires
that if the trial court imposes a sentence of death, "it shall set
forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is
based as to the facts (a) [t]hat sufficient [statutory] aggravating

circumstances exist . . . and (b) [t]hat there are insufficient
[statutory] mitigating circumstances . . . to outweigh the
aggravating circumstances." Fla. Stat. Ann.
9

I

§

921. 141(3)

(1976-1977 Supp. ).-

The statute provides for automatic review by the
Florida Supreme Court of all cases in which a death sentence has
been imposed. Fla. Stat. Ann.

§

921.141(4) (1976-1977 Supp. ).

The statute differs from that of Georgia in that it does not require the court to conduct any specific form of review. Since,
however, the trial judge must justify imposition of a death sentence with written findings, meaningful appellate review of each
such sentence is made possible, and the Florida Supreme Court,
like its Georgia counterpart, considers its function to be to
"guarantee . . . that the [aggravating and mitigating] reasons
present in one case will reach a similar result to that reached
under similar circumstances in another case . . . .

If a de-

fendant is sentenced to die, this Court can review that case in
light of the other decisions and determine whether or not the
punishment is too great." State v . . Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 10(1973).

- 8 -

On their face these procedures, like those used in
Georgia, appear to meet the constitutional deficiencies, identified
in Furman. The sentencing authority in Florida, the trial judge,
is directed to weigh eight aggravating factors against seven
mitigating factors to determine whether the death penalty should
be imposed. This determination requires the trial judge to focus
on the circumstances of the crime and the character of the
individual. He must, inter alia, consider whether the defendant
has a prior criminal record)
whether the defendant acted under duress or
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
whether the defendant's role in the crime was that of a minor accomplice, and whether the defendant's youth argues in favor
of a more lenient sentence than might otherwise be imposed upon
him. The trial judge must also determine whether the crime was
committed in the course of one of several enumerated felonies,
whether it was committed for pecuniary gain, whether it was
committed to assist in an escape from custody or to prevent a
lawful arrest, and whether the crime was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel. To answer these questions, which are

10-0 I uo,
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- 9not unlike those considered by a Georgia sentencing jury, compare
Gregg v. Stat§ ante, pp. _ _, the sentencing judge must focus
on the individual circumstances of each homicide and each defendant.
The basic difference between the Florida system and
that of Georgia is that in Florida the sentence is determined by

_!_Q_/
the trial judge rather than by the jury.

It would appear that

this difference should lead, if anything, to an even greater consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment in Florida than in Georgia, since a trial judge has much
more experience in sentencing than does a jury and is therefore
better able to impose sentences in line with those imposed in analogous
11 I

cases.
These Florida Gapital-sentencing procedures thus seek
to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Moreover, to the extent that any
risk to the contrary exists, it is minimized by Florida's appellate
review system under which the evidence of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances is reviewed and reweighed by the Florida
Supreme Court "to determine independently whether the imposition

..

- 10of the ultimate penalty is warranted." Songer v. State, 322 So.
2d 481, 484. See also Sullivan v. State, 303 So. 2d 680. The
Florida Supreme Court, like that of Georgia, has not hesitated
to vacate death sentences when it has determined that the sentence
should not have been imposed. Indeed, it has vacated 8 of the 21
death sentences that it has reviewed to date. See Taylor v.
State, 294 So. 2d 648; LaMadline v. State, 303 So. 2d 17; Slater
v. State, 316 So.2d 539; Swan v. State, 322 So.2d 485; Tedder
v. State, 322 So. 2d 908; Halliwell v. State, 323 So. 2d 557;
Thompson v. State; 328 So. 2d 1, Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137.
Under Florida's capital-sentencing

procedure~

in sum,

trial judges are given specific and detailed guidance to assist them
in deciding whether to impose capital punishment. Moreover, their
decisions are reviewed to -ensure that they are consistent with
other sentences imposed in similar circumstances. Thus, in
Florida, as in Georgia, it is no longer true that there is " 'no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the ·few cases in which [the
death penalty] is imposed from the many cases where it is not.' "
Gregg v. Georgia, ante, p.

quoting Furman v. Georgia,

408 U.S. 213, 313 (White, J., concurring). On its face the

-------~------------~--------1
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Florida system thus satisfies constitutional deficiencies identified
in Furman.
B

As in Gregg, the petitioner contends, however, that,
while perhaps facially acceptable, the new sentencing procedures
are in actual effect merely cosmetic, and that arbitrariness and
caprice still pervade the system under which Florida imposes
the death penalty.
(1)

The petitioner first claims that arbitrariness is inherent
in the Florida criminal justice system because it allows discretion
to be exercised at each stage of a criminal proceeding -- the
prosecutor's decision whether to charge a capital offense in the
first place, his decision whether to accept a plea to a lesser
-

offense, the jury's consideration of lesser included offenses, and,
after conviction and unsuccessful appeal, the executive's decision
whether to commute a death sentence. As we noted in Gregg,
this argument is based on a fundamental misinterpretation of
Furman, and we reject it for the reasons expressed in Gregg.
See ante, pp. b)-.'; .

- 12(2)

The petitioner next argues that the new Florida sentencing
procedures in reality do not eliminate the arbitrary infliction of
death that was condemned in Furman. Basically he contends
that the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances are
12/
vague and overbroad- and that the statute gives no guidance
as to how the mitigating and aggravating circumstances should
be weighed in any specific case.
(a)

Initially the petitioner asserts that the enumerated
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are so vague and so
broad that "virtually any first degree murder convict [is] a
candidate for a death sentence." In particular, it is argued,
the eighth statutory aggravating circumstance which authorizes
the death penalty to be imposed if the crime is "especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel," is intolerably vague and overbroad. Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 921.141(5)(h) (Supp. 1976-1977).

The Florida

Supreme Court has recognized, however, that while it is arguable
"that all killings are atrocious, . . . [s ]till we believe that the
Legislature intended something 'especially' heinous, atrocious
or .cruel when it authorized the death penalty for first degree
murder." Tedder v. State, 3 22 So. 2d 908, 910 (1975 ). As a

· ..

T::>-:JTOo,

ProflTft
- 13 -

consequence, the Court has indicated that this provision is directed
only at "the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily
torturous to the victim." State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (1973).
See also Alford v. State, 307 So. 2d 433, 445 (1975 ); Halliwell v.
13/
State, 323 So. 2d 557, 561 (1975).- As so construed, we cannot
say that the provision provides inadequate guidance to those
charged with the duty of recommending or imposing sentences in
capital cases. See Greggv. Georgia, ante, pp. 63-64.
The petitioner also c.laims that the third statutory
aggravating factor -- "[t]he defendant knowingly created a great
risk of ,death to many persons" -- is vague. In Dixon the Florida
Court indicated "that a man of ordinary intelligence and knowledge
easily conceives the concepts involved" in determining whether
this statutory aggravating -circumstance exists. 283 So. 2d, at
9. The only case in which this third aggravating factor was
found, except for the instant case, was Alvord v. State, 3 22 So. 2d
533 (1975 ), where the State Supreme Court found that the defendant
created a great risk of death because he "obviously murdered two
of the victims in order to avoid a surviving witness to the [first]

T::>- ::n oo, P rolTU

- 14murder." 322 So. 2d, at 540. In the present case this aggravating
circumstance was found, although the defendant attacked only one
person other than his murder victim. While as an original matter
we might not so construe the word "many, " we cannot say that the
14/
state courts acted unconstitutionally in doing so.
(b)

The petitioner next attacks the impreciseness of the
mitigating circumstances. He argues that whether a defendant
acted "undor the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," whether a defendant's capacity "to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was seriously impaired, " or whether
a defendant's participation as an accomplice in a capital felony
was "relatively minor,." are questions beyond the capacity of a
jury or judge to determine. See Fla. Stat. Ann.

§ §

921.141(6)(b),

(f), (d) (Supp. 1976-1977).
He also argues that neither a jury nor a judge is capable of deciding how to weigh a defendant's age or to determine
whether he had a "significant history of prior criminal activity."
See

§ §

921.141(6)(g), (a) (Supp. 1976-1977). In a similar vein

the petitioner argues that it is not possible to make a rational
determination whether there are "sufficient" aggravating circumstances which are not outweighed by the mitigating circumstances,

- 15 -

since the state law assigns no specific weight to any of the various
circumstances to be considered. See

§

921.141(2) (Supp. 1976-

1977).
While these questions and decisions may be hard, they
require no more line-drawing or hair-splitting than is commonly
required of a fact finder in a lawsuit. For example, juries have
traditionally decided the validity of defenses such as insanity
or reduced capacity, both of which involve the same considerations as some of the above-mentioned mitigating circumstances.
Wh.ile the various factors to be considered by the sentencing authorities
do not have numerical weights assigned to them, the requirements
of Furman are satisfied when the sentencing authority's discretion
is guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific factors
that argue in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty,
thus eliminating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its
imposition.
The directions given to judge and jury by the Florida
statute are sufficiently clear and precise to enable the various
aggravating circumstances to be weighed against the mitigating
ones. As a result the trial court's sentencing discretion is guided
and channeled by a system that focuses on the circumstances of
each individual homicide and individual defendant in deciding
whether the death penalty is to be imposed.

.....
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But even if it were accepted that one or more of the
statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstances is somewhat
vague or overbroad, this alone would not render the Florida
capital-sentencing procedure unconstitutional so long as there
existed some other safeguard to prevent imposition of the death
penalty on a capriciously selected group of convicted defendants.
Florida law has just such a safeguard in its provision for review
by the Florida Supreme Court of each. death sentence to ensure
"that the reasons present in one case will reach a result similar
15 I
to that reached under similar circumstances in another case."Nonetheless the petitioner attacks the Florida appellate
review process because the role of the Florida Supreme Court in
reviewing death sentences _is necessarily subjective and unpredictable. While it may be true that that Court has not chosen to
formulate an unvarying objective test as its standard of review
for all cases, it does not follow that the appellate review process
is ineffective or arbitrary. In fact, it is apparent that the Florida

-----------

::;---Court has responsibly
undertake to perform its function of death

sentence review with a maximum of rationality and consistency .

.
,
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For example, it has several times compared the circumstances of a case under review with those of other previous cases
in which it has assessed the imposition of death sentences. See,
e.g., Alford v. State, 307 So.2d 433, 445 (1975); Alvord v. State,
322 So. 2d 533, 540-541 (1975). By following this procedure
the Florida Court has in effect adopted the type of proportionality
review mandated by the Georgia statute. Compare Gregg v.
Georgia, ante, pp. 67-71. And any suggestion that the Florida
Court engages in only cursory or rubber stamp review of death
penalty cases is totally controverted by the fact it has vacated
over one-third of the death sentences that have come before it.
16/
Seep. 10,
supra.

IV
Florida, like Georgia, has enacted legislation in response
to Furman that passes con:stitutional muster. That legislation
provides that after a person is convicted of first degree murder,
there shall be an informed, focused, guided, and objective inquiry
into the question whether he should be sentenced to death. If a
death sentence is imposed, the sentencing authority articulates
in writing the statutory reasons that led to its decision. Those
reasons, and the evidence supporting them, are conscientiously
reviewed by a court which because of its statewise jurisdiction

It'

r"
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can assure consistency, fairness, and rationality in the evenhanded operation of the state law. As in Georgia, this system
assures that sentences of death will not be "wantonly" or "freakishly"
imposed. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 310 (Stewart,
J., concurring). Accordingly, the judgment before us is affirmed.
It is so ordered.

FOOTNOTES

_!_/
The murder occurred on July 10, 1973.

2/
She described the attacker as wearing light pants
and a pin stripe shirt with long sleeves rolled up to the elbow.
She also stated that the attacker was a medium-sized male.

3/
Seep. _ _ , infra.

4/

-Seep. _ _, infra.

5/
The murder statute under which petitioner was
convicted reads as follows:

"(1) (a) The unlawful killing of a human being when
perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the
death of the person killed or any human being, or when
committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of,
or in the attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or the
unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb, or which resulted from the unlawful
distribution of heroin by a person over the age of seventeen years when such drug is proven to be the proximate
cause of death of the user, shall be murder in the first
degree and shall constitute a capital felony, punishable
as provided in§ 775.082.

Fn-2

(b) In all cases under this section, the procedure
set forth in section 921.141 shall be followed in order
to determine sentence of death or life imprisonment."
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.04 (1973).
Another Florida statute authorizes imposition of the
death penalty upon conviction of sexual battery of a child under
twelve years of age. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794. 011(2) (Supp. 19761977). We do not in this opinion consider the constitutionality
of the death penalty for any offense other than first-degree murder.

6/
-

Compare Model Penal Code § 210. 6 (Proposed

Official Draft, 1962) (set out in Gregg v. Georgia, ante, at p. _ _ ,

n. 42).
The aggravating circumstances are:
"(a) The capital felony was committed by a person
under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another
capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat
of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of
death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant
was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission
of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing
or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson,
burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful
throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose
of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting
an escape from custody.

\

(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or
hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function
or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel."
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(5) (Supp. 1976-1977).
The mitigating circumstances are:
"(a) The defenda nt has no significant history of prior
criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's
conduct or consented to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital
felony committed by another person and his participation
was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under
the substantial domination of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime."
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6) (Supp. 1976-1977).

8/
-

Tedder has not always been cited when the Florida

Court has considered a judge-imposed death sentence following a
jury recommendation of life imprisonment. See, e.g., Thoml!son
v.

Sta!~,

328 So.2d 1 (1976); Douglas v. State, 328 So.2d 18

(1976~ _Dobpert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (1976). _But in the latter case, two j uc

relied on

:r~dd e :r

in s eparate opinions, one in support of reversing

the death sentence and one in support of affirming it.

·"'··
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9/
-In one case the Florida Court upheld a death sentence
where the trial judge had simply listed six aggravating factors as
justification for the sentence he imposed. Sawyer v. State, 313
So.2d 680 (1975). Since there were no mitigating factors, and
since some of these aggravating factors arguably fell within the
statutory categories, it is unclear whether the Florida Court would
uphold a death sentence that rested entirely on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. It seems unlikely that it would do so, since
the capital-sentencing statute explicitly provides that "[a]ggravating
circumstances shall be limited to the following [eight specified
factors.]." Fla. Stat. Ann.

§

921.141(5) (Supp. 1976-1977).

(emphasis added). There is no such limiting language introducing
the list of statutory mitigating factors. See

§

921.141 (6) (Supp.

1976-1977). See also n. 1"4 infra.
10/
-

Because the trial judge imposes sentence, the

Florida court has ruled that he may order preparation of a presentence investigation report to assist him in determining the
appropriate sentence. See Swan v. State, 322 So.2d 485, 488489 (1975 ); Songer v. State, 3 22 So. 2d 481, 484 (1975). These
reports, of course, contain much information relevant to sentencing. See Gregg v. Georgia, ante, p. _ _ , n. 35.

FN5

_!!I
See ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives & Procedures § 1.1(b), Commentary, pp. 45-46; President's
Commn. on Law Enforcement & Administration of Justice: The
Challenge of Crime in a .F ree Society, Task Force Report: The
Courts, 26 (1967). See also Gregg v. Georgia 2 ante, pp. 51-52,
In the words of the Florida Court, "[A] trial judge with experience
in the facts of criminality possesses the requisite knowledge to
balance the facts of the case against the standard criminal activity
which can only be developed by involvement with the trials
of num erous defendants." State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d, at 8.

B_/
As in _Qregg.z. we examine the claims of vagueness
and overbreadth in the statutory criteria only i.ns!Jfar as it is
necessary to determine wh ether there is a substantial

ris~

that

the Florida capital-sentencing; system, whe:.1 vie-..ved in its entirety, will resu,.t in the randJm and arbitrary imposition of the

n. 50.
13 I
- - The Florida

sente:.1ces i.n several cas.8 s,

S:1p:re~e

Court has affirmed death

in~ludin,5

the instant case, where

this eighth statutorJ aggravating factor was found, without specifically

. ·.~..

~~--- ------------~~·N-

.

stating that th= homicide was "pitiless" or "torturous to the vic tim."

See,~_:~,

Hallman v.

Sta~

305 So. 2d 180 (1974) (victim's

throat slit with broken bottle); Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d
666 (1975) ("career criminal" shot sleeping traveling companion);
Gardner v. _§tate, 313 So. 2d 675 (1975) (brutal beating and murder);
Alvord v. --~tate, 3 22 So. 2d 533 (1975) (three women killed by
strangulation, one raped);
(depraved murder);

He~n· y

Do~tgla~

v.

v. £)tate, 328 So. 2d 18 (1976)

Sta!~..L

328 So. 2d 430 (1976) (torture

murder); Dobber_t. v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (1076) (torture and
killing of two children). But the circumst ances of all of these
cases could accurately be characterized as "pitiless" and "unnecessarily torturous, " and it thus does not appear that the Florida
Court has aba ndoned the definition that it announced in D xon and

-

14/
The petitioner notes further that Florida's sentencin g

system fails to channel jury or judge discretion because it allows
for consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors. In the only
case to approve such a practice, Sawyer v.

St at~

313 So. 2d 68 0

(1975 ), the Florida Court recast the trial court's six nonstatutory
aggravating factors into four aggravating circumstances -- two of
them statutory. As noted earlier, it is unclear that the Florida

•·'

Court would ever approve a death sentence based entirely on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. See n. 9, supra.
15 I
-

State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d, at 10.

16/
- - The petitioner also argues that since the Florida

Court does not review sentences of life imprisonment imposed in
capital cases or sentences imposed in cases where a capital crime
was charged but where the jury convicted of a lesser offense, it
will have an unbalanced view of the way that the typical jury
treates a murder case and it will affirm death sentences under
circumstances where the vast majority of juries would have returned a verdict of life hnprisonment. As we noted in Gregg v.
Georgia, ante, p. __, n. 55, this problem is not sufficient to
raise a serious risk that the state capital-sentencing system will
result in arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.

,.

.

.

